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Abstract
According to Werner Sombarts classic text Luxury and Capitalism, the status-
seeking behavior of individuals may facilitate the development of capitalism and give
rise to an early industrialization. In this study, we develop a growth-theoretic frame-
work to formalize this hypothesis by introducing a status-seeking preference into the
Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤. Then, we use the model to explore
how this cultural preference a¤ects the transition of an economy from pre-industrial
stagnation to modern economic growth. We nd that a stronger preference for status
seeking causes an earlier takeo¤ and a positive e¤ect on economic growth in the short
run but an overall ambiguous e¤ect on growth in the long run. We also calibrate the
model to data to perform a quantitative analysis and nd that a stronger status-seeking
preference reduces the steady-state equilibrium growth rate under reasonable parame-
ter values. Therefore, the e¤ects of status-seeking behaviors evolve across di¤erent
stages of economic development.
JEL classi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A new emphasis on the deployment of expensive, often durable manufac-
tured objectssilks, mirrors, elegant furniture, etc.replaced earlier ways of
expressing status, such as maintaining large retinues, which did less to stimulate
production. Pomeranz (2001, p. 107)
The bourgeois who lived in a hierarchical society had to prove himself and his
self-worth [...] and thus necessitated a new, heightened degree of luxury. This
further increased the demand for luxury, which according to Sombart specically
resulted in the creation of new markets that expanded the economy: as the desire
for luxury grew immensely, so did the markets to accommodate it. Franchetti
(2013, p. 135-136)
1 Introduction
According to Sombart (1967), the status-seeking behavior of individuals may facilitate the
development of capitalism and give rise to an early industrialization. In this study, we
provide a growth-theoretic framework to formalize this hypothesis. Specically, we introduce
a status-seeking preference into the Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤ in
Peretto (2015). Then, we use the model to explore how this cultural preference a¤ects the
transition of an economy from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth. In
summary, we nd that a stronger preference for status seeking leads to an earlier takeo¤
and a higher rate of economic growth in the short run. However, the overall e¤ect of status
seeking on long-run economic growth is ambiguous. Therefore, the e¤ects of status-seeking
behaviors evolve across di¤erent stages of economic development.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. The preference for status
seeking encourages the accumulation of assets and mitigates the preference for discounting,
which in turn reduces the equilibrium interest rate. This interest-rate e¤ect from the status-
seeking preference serves to stimulate the entry of rms with new products and the quality
improvement of products (for a given market size of rms). Therefore, the market size (which
is increasing in the population size)1 required for innovation to occur becomes smaller, and
the economy experiences an earlier transition to growth. However, the increased entry of
rms eventually reduces the market size of each rm. Given that the equilibrium rate of
innovation also depends positively on the rm size,2 the overall e¤ect of status seeking on
economic growth in the long run is ambiguous. We also calibrate the model to data to
perform a quantitative analysis and nd that a stronger status-seeking preference reduces
the steady-state equilibrium growth rate under reasonable parameter values.
This study relates to the literature on economic growth and innovation. Romer (1990)
develops the seminal R&D-based growth model in which the invention of new products drives
innovation. Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian growth model in which
the quality improvement of products drives innovation.3 A small number of studies in this
1Kremer (1993) provides evidence for a positive relationship between the population size and technological
progress in early historical eras.
2See Cohen and Klepper (1996a, b) for evidence.
3See also Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other early studies.
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literature explore how the behavioral aspects of peoples preferences a¤ect innovation and
economic growth; see for example, Chu (2007) on entrepreneurial overcondence, Furukawa
et al. (2018, 2019) on the love of novelty, and Pan et al. (2018) and Hof and Prettner (2019)
on status-seeking preferences. We contribute to this literature by introducing a status-seeking
preference into the second-generation Schumpeterian growth model,4 whose implications are
supported by empirical evidence,5 to explore its di¤erent implications on economic growth
at di¤erent time horizons, which complement the interesting studies by Pan et al. (2018)
and Hof and Prettner (2019) who consider status-seeking households in the Romer model
and focus on economic growth in the long run.6
This study also relates to the literature on economic growth and endogenous takeo¤.
In this literature, seminal studies by Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002)
develop unied growth theory.7 Unied growth theory explores the endogenous transition of
an economy from stagnation to growth through a quality-quantity tradeo¤ in childrearing and
human-capital accumulation.8 In this literature, Galor and Michalopoulos (2012) explore the
evolutionary advantage of entrepreneurial spirit at di¤erent stages of economic development.
The present study relates to this literature by introducing a status-seeking preference into
a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous takeo¤ developed by Peretto (2015) and
exploring how this cultural preference a¤ects the endogenous transition of an economy from
the pre-industrial era to modern industrial eras through technological progress.9
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
provides our results and performs a quantitative analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian model with status-seeking culture
The Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤ is based on Peretto (2015). We
consider two types of agents in the Peretto model: workers and asset owners. Further-
more, we assume that asset owners have a status-seeking preference to aunt their wealth
as hypothesized by Sombart (1967).10
2.1 Population
The population size in the economy at time t is Lt, which grows at an exogenous rate  > 0.
An exogenous share s 2 (0; 1) of the population is workers, and they simply consume their
4Peretto (1994, 1998, 1999), Smulders and van de Klundert (1995), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998),
Young (1998) and Howitt (1999) combine the two dimensions of innovation and develop the second-generation
Schumpeterian growth model, which is free from the counterfactual scale e¤ect in the Romer model.
5See Laincz and Peretto (2006), Ha and Howitt (2007), Madsen (2008, 2010) and Ang and Madsen (2011).
6There is also an established literature on status seeking and economic growth in capital-based growth
models; see Kurz (1968), Zou (1994, 1995), Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and Futagami and Shibata (1998) for
early studies and Pan et al. (2018) for a discussion of subsequent studies in this literature.
7See also Jones (2001) and Hansen and Prescott (2002) for other early studies on endogenous takeo¤.
8See also Galor and Mountford (2008), Galor et al. (2009), Ashraf and Galor (2011) and Galor (2011).
9Chu et al. (2020) explore the e¤ects of patent protection on endogenous takeo¤ in the Peretto model.
10See He¤etz and Frank (2011) for a survey of experimental and empirical evidence on preferences for
social status.
3
wage income wt. The remaining share 1   s of the population is asset owners, and they
accumulate assets for consumption and status seeking.
2.2 Status-seeking households
There is a unit continuum of households, which are indexed by h 2 [0; 1]. They have identical
homothetic preferences over consumption. Household hs utility function is given by11
U(h) =
Z
1
0
e ( )t

ln ct(h) +  ln

at(h)
at

dt, (1)
where ct(h) is household hs per capita consumption of the nal good (numeraire) and
the parameter  >  is the subjective discount rate. The parameter  > 0 captures the
households status-seeking preference in its wealth relative to other households. The asset-
accumulation equation is given by
_at(h) = (rt   )at(h)  ct(h), (2)
where at(h) is the real value of assets owned by each member of household h.
We perform dynamic optimization and obtain the growth path of consumption ct(h) as
_ct(h)
ct(h)
= rt   + 
ct(h)
at(h)
, (3)
where the term ct(h)=at(h) captures the e¤ect of the status-seeking behavior of households.
Although the households are heterogeneous ex ante, they are homogeneous ex post such that
ct(h) = ct and at(h) = at for all h 2 [0; 1].
12
2.3 Final good
The production function of the nal good is given by13
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)

Zt (i)Z
1 
t Ly;t=N
1 
t
1 
di, (4)
where f; ; g 2 (0; 1). Nt is the number of di¤erentiated intermediate goods. Ly;t denotes
production workers and is given by Ly;t = sLt in equilibrium. Xt (i) is the quantity of non-
durable intermediate good i 2 [0; Nt]. The productivity of Xt (i) depends on its own quality
11Given the complexity of our model with multiple dimensions of innovation, we focus on the log utility
function for analytical tractability, which also has the advantage of being consistent with the relative-wealth-
status specication in Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and Futagami and Shibata (1998) and the absolute-wealth-
status specication in Zou (1994, 1995).
12This assumption can be rationalized by an equal initial wealth a0(h) = a0 such that at(h) = at for all t.
See Chu and Peretto (2019) for an analysis of heterogeneous households in the Peretto model.
13A more familiar special case of the production function is Yt =
R Nt
0
Xt (i) [Zt (i)Ly;t]
1 
di, which
however does not capture technology spillovers 1    and the congestion e¤ect 1    of variety. The latter
feature serves to remove the scale e¤ect for all  < 1; see Peretto (2018) for a discussion on the robustness
of scale invariance in the second-generation Schumpeterian growth model.
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Zt (i) as well as the average quality of all intermediate goods Zt 
R Nt
0
Zt (j) dj=Nt, which
captures technology spillovers. The parameter  determines the private return to quality,
and hence, 1  determines the degree of technology spillovers. The parameter  determines
a congestion e¤ect 1   of variety. As we will show, the social return to variety is .
Prot maximization yields the conditional demand functions for Ly;t and Xt (i) as
wt = (1  )
Yt
Ly;t
, (5)
Xt (i) =


Pt (i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t Ly;t
N1 t
, (6)
where Pt (i) is the price of Xt (i). Perfect competition implies that nal-good rms pay
(1  )Yt = wtLy;t for workers and Yt =
R Nt
0
Pt (i)Xt (i) di for intermediate goods.
2.4 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
The intermediate-good sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. There is a con-
tinuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt]. A monopolistic rm produces di¤er-
entiated intermediate good i with a linear technology that requires Xt (i) units of the nal
good to produce Xt (i) units of intermediate good i. In other words, the marginal cost for the
monopolistic rm in industry i to produce Xt (i) with quality Zt (i) is one. The monopolistic
rm also needs to incur Zt (i)Z
1 
t units of the nal good as a xed operating cost. To
improve the quality of its products, the rm devotes It (i) units of the nal good to in-house
R&D. The process of in-house R&D is specied as
_Zt (i) = It (i) . (7)
The rms (before-R&D) prot ow at time t is
t (i) = [Pt (i)  1]Xt (i)  Z

t (i)Z
1 
t . (8)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt (i) =
Z
1
t
exp

 
Z s
t
rudu

[s (i)  Is (i)] ds. (9)
The monopolistic rm maximizes (9) subject to (7) and (8). We solve this dynamic
optimization problem below and nd that the familiar prot-maximizing price is
Pt(i) = 1=. (10)
Following the standard approach in the literature, we consider a symmetric equilibrium in
which Zt (i) = Zt for i 2 [0; Nt] and the size of each intermediate-good rm is identical across
all industries Xt (i) = Xt.
14 From (6) and (10), the quality-adjusted rm size is
Xt
Zt
= 2=(1 )
Ly;t
N1 t
. (11)
14Symmetry also implies t (i) = t, It (i) = It and Vt (i) = Vt.
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We dene the following transformed variable:
xt  s
2=(1 ) Lt
N1 t
=
Xt
Zt
, (12)
which is a state variable whose dynamics depends on the ratio Lt=N
1 
t . Lemma 1 shows
that the rate of return on quality-improving R&D is increasing in the rm size xt.
Lemma 1 The rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D is given by
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

1  

xt   

. (13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.5 Entrants
To enter the market with a new variety of intermediate goods and set up its operation, a
new rm has to pay Xt units of the nal good, where  > 0 is an entry-cost parameter.
The value of a new rm at time t is Vt.
15 The asset-pricing equation can be written as
rt =
t   It
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (14)
When entry is positive, the entry condition is given by
Vt = Xt. (15)
Then, we can use (8), (10), (12), (14) and (15) to derive the rate of return on entry as
ret =
t   It
Zt
Zt
Xt
+
_Xt
Xt
=
1


1  

 
+ zt
xt

+ zt +
_xt
xt
, (16)
which also uses _Vt=Vt = _Xt=Xt = zt + _xt=xt, and zt  _Zt=Zt is the quality growth rate.
Equation (16) shows that the rate of return on entry is also increasing in the rm size xt.
2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fat; Yt; Ct; Xt; Itg and prices frt; wt; Pt; Vtg such
that
 workers supply labor and consume their wage income wt;
 asset owners maximize utility taking rt as given;
15To ensure symmetry, we assume that all new rms at time t have access to the aggregate technology Zt.
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 competitive nal-good rms produce Yt and maximize prots taking fwt; Ptg as given;
 intermediate-good rms choose fPt; Itg to maximize Vt taking rt as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking Vt as given;
 the value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households
assets such that NtVt = at(1  s)Lt;
 the labor market clears such that Ly;t = sLt; and
 the market-clearing condition of nal good holds:
Yt = Ct +Nt (Xt + Zt + It) + _NtXt,
where Ct = ct(1  s)Lt + wtsLt is the total consumption of asset owners and workers.
2.7 Aggregate production function
Substituting (6) and (10) into (4) yields the aggregate production function given by
Yt = s
2=(1 )Nt ZtLt. (17)
The growth rate of per capita output yt  Yt=Lt is then
gt 
_yt
yt
= nt + zt. (18)
which depends on the variety growth rate nt  _Nt=Nt and the quality growth rate zt.
2.8 Dynamics of the consumption-wealth ratio
We can use (3) to rewrite (2) as
_ct
ct
 
_at
at
= (1 + )
ct
at
  + ,
which shows that the ct=at ratio always jumps to the following steady-state value:
ct
at
=
1
1 + 
(  ) . (19)
Substituting (19) into (3) yields the interest rate as
rt =
_ct
ct
+  

1 + 
(  ) , (20)
which shows that the preference for status seeking mitigates the preference for discounting
and reduces the equilibrium interest rate (for a given consumption growth rate of the house-
holds). As we will show, this interest-rate e¤ect from the status-seeking preference serves to
stimulate the entry of rms and quality-improving R&D but also reduces the steady-state
equilibrium rm size.
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3 Status-seeking culture and endogenous takeo¤
As we will show below, the dynamics of the economy is determined by the dynamics of the
rm size xt, which is stable if the following condition holds:
 >
1


1  

  

  
1 + 
+

1  

>
1  

. (21)
Given an initial value x0 > =(1   ),
16 the economy begins in a pre-industrial era in
which the growth rate of output per capita is zero. As the market size of rms becomes
su¢ciently large, the economy enters into the rst industrial era in which rms start to
create new products. Then, as the market size of rms becomes even larger, the economy
enters into the second industrial era in which rms also start to improve the quality of
products. Eventually, the economy converges to the balanced growth path as the rm size
xt converges to the steady state. In what follows, we show that a stronger preference for
status seeking gives rise to an earlier takeo¤ of the economy (i.e., from the pre-industrial era
to the rst industrial era).
3.1 The pre-industrial era
In the pre-industrial era, the rm size xt is too small for innovation to be viable. Therefore,
the growth rate of output per capita is
gt = nt + zt = 0 (22)
because nt = zt = 0. In the pre-industrial era, the economy is in an equilibrium with
zero growth because the rm size xt is not large enough to provide su¢cient incentives for
innovation. However, the state variable xt = s
2=(1 )Lt=N
1 
0 increases according to
_xt
xt
= , (23)
and the rm size xt eventually becomes su¢ciently large to trigger the transition to growth.
3.2 The rst industrial era
Variety-expanding innovation becomes viable when the rm size xt reaches the threshold:
xN 

(1  )=   (  )=(1 + )
> x0, (24)
which is decreasing in the status-seeking parameter . Intuitively, a stronger status-seeking
preference reduces the equilibrium interest rate, which in turn increases the value of monop-
olistic rms and provides more incentives for the entry of rms; therefore, the market size
that is required for triggering entry becomes smaller.
16This condition implies 0 > 0.
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Lemma 2 shows that the ct=yt ratio jumps to a steady-state value when the economy
enters the rst industrial era. This stationary property implies that ct and yt grow at the
same rate; i.e., _ct=ct = _yt=yt.
Lemma 2 Whenever nt > 0, the ct=yt ratio jumps to the steady state.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given Lemma 2, we can use (16) and (20) to derive the variety growth rate as17
nt =
1


1  

 

xt

 
  
1 + 
> 0, (25)
which is positive given xt > xN . Substituting (25) into _xt=xt =   (1  )nt yields
_xt =
1  


 

1  

  

  
1 + 
+

1  

xt

> 0. (26)
Finally, the equilibrium growth rate of output per capita is
gt = nt =



1  

 

xt

 
(  )
1 + 
> 0, (27)
which is increasing in the status-seeking parameter  (for a given rm size xt). Intuitively,
a stronger status-seeking preference reduces the equilibrium interest rate and provides more
incentives for the entry of rms. In summary, economic growth is driven by variety-expanding
innovation in the rst industrial era and gradually rises as the rm size xt increases.
3.3 The second industrial era
When the rm size xt reaches the second threshold xZ (to be derived below), quality-
improving innovation also becomes viable. In this case, the equilibrium growth rate of
output per capita is given by
gt = rt   +

1 + 
(  ) = 

1  

xt   

  +

1 + 
(  ) > 0, (28)
which uses rt = r
q
t in (13) and is increasing in the status-seeking parameter  (for a given
rm size xt). Intuitively, a stronger status-seeking preference reduces the equilibrium interest
rate and provides more incentives for in-house R&D. The equilibrium growth rate gt in (28)
continues to rise gradually as the rm size xt increases.
17Here we also use zt = 0, r
e
t = rt = + gt   ct=at = + nt   ct=at and _xt=xt =   (1  )nt.
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In the second industrial era, economic growth is driven by both quality-improving inno-
vation and variety-expanding innovation. Then, (18) and (28) imply that the quality growth
rate zt is given by
zt = gt   nt = 

1  

xt   

  +

1 + 
(  )  nt > 0, (29)
where the variety growth rate nt can be derived from (16) and (20) as
18
nt =
1


1  

 
+ zt
xt

 
  
1 + 
> 0. (30)
We can use (29) and (30) to solve for the variety growth rate nt and substitute it into
_xt=xt =   (1  )nt to derive the linearized dynamics of xt as
_xt =
1  


(1  ) 

  
1 + 
+

1  

 

(1  ) (1  )

  

  
1 + 
+

1  

xt

 0,
(31)
which uses the approximation =xt = 0 as in Peretto (2015). We can also use (29) and (30)
to solve for the quality growth rate zt as a function of xt. The following threshold for xt > xZ
ensures zt > 0:
xZ  arg
x
solve

1  

x  

 

x

=
(1  )(  )
1 + 
+ 

. (32)
The following parameter restriction ensures that xZ > xN :
19
 <
1


1  

 
  
1 + 
"
1 +

1 + 
  
2
 (1  )

#
. (33)
3.4 Balanced growth path
In the long run, the rm size xt converges to the steady state x
 given by
x(
 
) =
(1  ) 
 
 
1+
+ 
1 

(1  )(1  )=   
 
 
1+
+ 
1 
 > 0, (34)
which is decreasing in the status-seeking parameter  given (21) due to a higher rate of entry
of rms such that the market size of each rm eventually becomes smaller. The steady-state
equilibrium growth rate is then
g = 

1  

x(
 
)  

  +

1 + 
(  ) > 0, (35)
18Here we also use ret = rt = + gt   ct=at = + nt + zt   ct=at and _xt=xt =   (1  )nt.
19Derivations are available upon request.
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which can be either increasing or decreasing in the status-seeking parameter . On the one
hand, the status-seeking preference mitigates the preference for discounting and reduces the
equilibrium interest rate, which stimulates quality-improving R&D. On the other hand, it
also stimulates the entry of rms and decreases the equilibrium rm size, which reduces
economic growth.
3.5 Dynamics from stagnation to growth
The dynamics of the equilibrium growth rate from stagnation to growth can be summarized
as follows. In the pre-industrial era, the growth rate of output per capita is zero. When
the economy enters the rst industrial era with variety-expanding innovation, the growth
rate of output per capita becomes positive. After that, the growth rate rises further as
the economy enters the second industrial era with both quality-improving innovation and
variety-expanding innovation. Eventually, the economy converges to the balanced growth
path with a steady-state equilibrium growth rate; see Figure 1.
Figure 1 also shows that a stronger preference  for status seeking leads to an earlier
takeo¤ of the economy because xN in (24) is decreasing in the status-seeking parameter ,
which reduces the equilibrium interest rate and increases the value of monopolistic rms. For
a given xt, a stronger preference  for status seeking also increases the equilibrium growth
rate by reducing the interest rate and providing more incentives for the entry of rms and
quality-improving R&D; see (27) and (28). This positive e¤ect of status-seeking preference
on economic growth is consistent with Pan et al. (2018) and Hof and Prettner (2019).
However, we also nd that the steady-state equilibrium rm size is decreasing in  due to
the increased entry of rms. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of status-seeking preference  on
the steady-state equilibrium growth rate is ambiguous. We summarize all these results in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 A stronger preference for status seeking leads to an earlier takeo¤ and a
higher rate of economic growth (for a given rm size) in industrial eras; however, it also
reduces the steady-state rm size and has an ambiguous e¤ect on long-run economic growth.
Proof. Proven in text.
Figure 1: Dynamics of the growth rate
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3.6 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to US data to perform a quantitative analysis. The
model features the following parameters: f; ; ; ; ; ; ; g. We set the discount rate 
to a conventional value of 0.05. We follow Iacopetta et al. (2019) to set the social return of
variety  to 0.25. The long-run population growth rate in the US is 1.8%.20 Furthermore,
we calibrate f; ; g by matching the following moments of the US economy: 60% for the
labor income share of GDP, 64% for the consumption share of GDP, and 2% for the long-run
growth rate of output per capita. We consider a range of values for  2 [0:05; 0:65], which
determines the degree of technology spillovers 1   . Finally, we consider  = 0 as our
benchmark and simulate the steady-state growth rate as  increases.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
      
0.050 0.050 0.250 0.018 0.400 7.813 3.352
0.200 0.050 0.250 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.802
0.350 0.050 0.250 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.438
0.500 0.050 0.250 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.292
0.650 0.050 0.250 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.214
Figure 2: Status seeking and long-run growth Figure 3: Simulated path of the growth rate
Figure 2 simulates the e¤ects of the status-seeking preference  on the steady-state equi-
librium growth rate g under di¤erent values of . For all values of , the steady-state
growth rate g is decreasing in . We see that as the value of  increases (i.e., the degree of
technology spillovers 1    decreases), the negative e¤ect of  becomes stronger. Equation
(35) shows that the magnitude of the negative e¤ect of  via x is increasing in . We stop
at the value of  = 0:65 because a larger value of  corresponds to a smaller calibrated value
of  in Table 1, and the inequality in (21) requires a su¢ciently large . Iacopetta et al.
(2019) nd that the empirically relevant range of values for  is from 0.17 to 0.33. Therefore,
we conclude that a stronger status-seeking preference reduces the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate under reasonable parameter values. We consider the set of parameter values
20Data source: Maddison Project Database.
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that correspond to  = 0:2. Figure 3 simulates and compares the dynamic paths of the
equilibrium growth rate from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth for the
following values of  2 f0; 0:5g. The larger value of  leads to an earlier takeo¤ by about 4
years but reduces the long-run growth rate from 2% to 1.2%.
4 Conclusion
In this study, we have introduced a status-seeking preference into the Schumpeterian growth
model to explore how this cultural preference a¤ects the endogenous transition of an economy
from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth. We nd that a stronger prefer-
ence for status seeking leads to an earlier takeo¤ by increasing the entry of rms with new
di¤erentiated products. This theoretical nding formalizes the hypothesis on status-seeking
luxury and capitalism proposed by Sombart (1967).
Furthermore, a stronger preference for status seeking causes a higher rate of economic
growth in the short run by increasing the entry of rms and quality-improving R&D. How-
ever, due to the increased entry of rms, the market size of each rm eventually becomes
smaller and causes a negative e¤ect on economic growth. As a result, the overall e¤ect of
a stronger status-seeking preference on long-run economic growth is ambiguous. These con-
trasting e¤ects on economic growth at di¤erent time horizons highlight the importance of
endogenous rm size (which removes the scale e¤ect) for the analysis of status seeking and
economic growth.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We use the Hamiltonian to solve the rms dynamic optimization.
The current-value Hamiltonian of rm i is given by
Ht (i) = t (i)  It (i) + t (i) _Zt (i) , (A1)
where t (i) is the costate variable on _Zt (i). We substitute (6)-(8) into (A1) and derive
@Ht (i)
@Pt (i)
=
@t (i)
@Pt (i)
= 0, (A2)
@Ht (i)
@It (i)
= 0) t (i) = 1, (A3)
@Ht (i)
@Zt (i)
= 
(
[Pt (i)  1]


Pt (i)
1=(1 )
sLt
N1 
  
)
Z1 t
Z1 t (i)
= rtt (i) 
_t (i) , (A4)
where Zt (i) is a state variable. It can be shown that @t (i) =@Pt (i) = 0 yields Pt (i) = 1=.
Substituting (A3), (10) and (12) into (A4) and imposing symmetry yield (13).
Proof of Lemma 2. When the economy enters into the rst industrial era, variety-
expanding innovation is activated. Then, we can apply the entry condition Vt = Xt to
at =
VtNt
(1  s)Lt
=
XtNt
(1  s)Lt
=
2
1  s
yt, (A5)
which also uses Yt = PtXtNt = XtNt=. Di¤erentiating (A5) with respect to t yields
2
1  s
_yt = _at = (rt   )
2
1  s
yt   ct. (A6)
Then, we can use (3) and (A5) to rearrange (A6) as
_ct
ct
 
_yt
yt
= (1 + )
1  s
2
ct
yt
  + , (A7)
which shows that the ct=yt ratio jumps to its steady-state value when the economy enters
the rst industrial era.
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